Introduction
Is personal revelation the right of the subject alone or can others tell the story even without consent? The question lies at the heart of recent celebrity privacy cases. When Michael Douglas and Catherine Zetajones claimed their wedding party had been intercepted by underground paparazzi with the photographs to be published in Hello!, their complaint was not that they should be let alone completely. Indeed they had contracted with OK! to give the public account of their celebration with carefully vetted authorised pictures. Yet they claimed their privacy was implicated and the equitable action for breach of confidence was the way to protect this; a claim partly and with some reservations accepted by the courts, which refused an interlocutory injunction 1 but subsequently allowed damages for the unauthorised publication (at the time suggesting the injunction should have been awarded).Z When Naomi Campbell found herself the subject of an article in the Mirror revealing details of her treatment for a drug addiction, with covertly taken photographs in support, her essential complaint was that the story had been obtained and published without her knowledge or approval (although conceding that her own previous false accounts meant she was in no position to prevent telling about her addiction). Further, the House of Lords left her the option in finding her confidence breached. 3 In the New Zealand case of Hoskingv. Runting, where a tort of public disclosure of private facts was recognised
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Violation of property right
The Lord Chancellor did not restrict his grounds to breach of trust and confid ence, fo r he referred also to the ' right and property' in the etchings, which the plaintiff was 'entitled to keep wholly for his private use and pleasu re', as justifying an injunction against unauthorised publication.
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Knight Bruce V-C had reached a like conclusion. 18 The language of' prope rty' is reflective oft he times. By the mid-nineteenth century, property was understood to be the starting point of a market economy. Having something to trade was seen as fundamental to participation in its commercial and social institutions and a particularly respected source of wealth was labour and ingenuity which, marshalled to the needs of the market, could become a pathway to prosperity and progress. 19 Enabling a market lay at the heart of many nineteenth-century cases of confidential information. Trade secrets were often labelled ' property'. 20 So too were unpublished texts, including texts of a more personal kind as with the royal family etchings-even if here it was acknowledged that value might be found not 1~ Prince Albert v. Strange ( 1849) I H & TW 1 at 23; 4 7 ER 1302 at 13 11 . 16 Campbellv. MGN Lrd 12004 12 AC457. 1t may be noted that the Law Lords were not always entirely dear that the reasoning was n ot premised on a very extended idea of the relationship of confidence: see, e.g., Lord Hope at para. 85. In this respect Australian courts have been clea rer, positing that surreptitious obtaining is in itself a violation of a n obligation of trust and confidence, arising even as between strangers: see Australian Broadcasting Corporation v. Lerwh Game Meats (200 l) 208 CLR 199 at paras. 39-40 (Gleeso n Cl), para.
123 (Gummow and Hayne Jj) and para. 223 Callinan J. O n the other hand Australian courts may yet find other reasons to consi der breach of co nfidence a limited vehicle for celebrity privacy protection; a nd the possibility of a tort o f privacy was not foreclosed in just in market exchange but in private use, including private circulation among family and friends, as was common at the time. 21 Recognised as 'the produce of mental labours, thoughts and sentiments recorded and preserved by writing' and 'desired by the author to remain not generally known', 22 the right of publication of such texts was reserved to the author on the basis of a property right in the unpublished work, supplementing the various statutory copyrights in published works. 'Common law copyright' has now been abolished by the statutory copyright system, 23 but in 1849 it was well-established. As Lord Cottenham LC said, '(t]he property in an author or composer of any work, whether of literature, art or science, such work being unpublished and kept for his private use or pleasure, cannot be disputed after the many decisions in which that proposition has been affirmed or assumed' . 24 The issue was simply its scope. It was clear that it prevented publication of the etchings after royal permission was refused, as Strange conceded. Nevertheless he contested the right to prevent publication of the descriptive catalogue, arguing this gave information about but did not publish the etchings themselves. The argument failed to persuade either the Vice-Chancellor or the Lord Chancellor who observed that 'a copy or impression of the etchings could only be a means of communicating the knowledge and information of the original'.25 The conclusion: the choice to exploit publicly the property or else to keep it for 'private use or pleasure' was the author's choice alone.
26
One common conception about nineteenth-century literary and artistic property is that the romantic idea of the author-genius exerted some 21 influence over the principles applied.
27 In reality, in these utilitarian times the emphasis was on the value to be found in the work by its audience. not professional' but rather 'a man on account of whose name alone ...
[the information I would be a matter of general curiosity'.
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Passing off
Of course, once it was accepted that insight into a celebrity's 'bent and turn of the mind' and 'feelings and taste' was the public's true desire it was a small step to acknowledge that authenticity may not require authorship, at least in any obvious sense of 'clothing our conceptions in words' (as William Blackstone put it in Tonson v. Collins) . 35 A third claim in Prince Albert v. Strange, introduced before Lord Cottenham LC, was not based on violation of a property right in the etchings (or even breach of trust), but on a statement in the defendant's catalogue giving the false impression that both the catalogue and the exhibition it purportedly accompanied were authorised, and therefore authentic. In this early age of character merchandising, especially as to royal memorabilia, 36 it was plainly thought a ready market could be found both for the exhibition and for the catalogue, especially if the latter not only gave a list and description of the works but aJso had inscribed on its title page that: project was a ploy erected around a plan to be 'bought off'), the proceedings continued on the basis of the 'overt acts' .
38 T hese, Lord Cottenham LC held, were enough to establish a 'falsehood o n the public: for 'as permission so to accompany each catalogue sold necessarily implies permission to sell the catalogue itself, the case is complete of an intention to sell under a false representation that the whole transaction is not only with the knowledge but with the approbation of the Plaintiff' . 39 Th e reference to 'false representation' evokes the emerging action of passing off. 40 In the twenty-first century we have become accustomed to think the practice of character merchandising a recent phenomenon, and with that the extension of laws about false representations to representations of sponsorship or approval.
41 Yet, in this early case, we can already see the beginnings of an understanding that if the purchasing public places value on a celebrity's personal endorsement of goods or services, there may be more than one reason to insist that a claimed endorsement be given.
Admittedly, in Clarkv. Freeman, 42 decided the year before, an eminent royal physician and expert on consumptive complaints could not prevent an apothecary selling a quack medicine promoted as 'Sir J Clarke's consumption pills'-the case later taken as authority for a 'common field of activity' rule which dogged the law of passing off through much of the twentieth century.
43 A merely libellous publication was not thought by Lord Langdale MR, who recalled the dark days of the Star Chamber, to warrant an injunction. Such conduct was, it was said, 'one o f the taxes' to which person s of high station become su bject 'by the very eminence they have acquired in the world'. 44 However, in seeking the injunction Clark could not show his professional income prejudiced from such statements, wlhich by his own account were unlikely to be believed by the medical professionals w ho might ask his advice. In the different circumstances of Prince Albert v. Stra11ge, royal patronage of public events, especially of the arts, was established, 4~ and the m isrepresentation was directed to the paying public who might be misled by a fa lsehood that consent had been obtai ned. Further, the possibility of the plaintiff wishing to give his endorsement in more suitable circumstances was not foreclosed. The Solicitor-General posited that at some later date a royally approved exhibition of the etchings might be permitted, say for charitable purposes, adding 'if that so happened, could it be doubted that a descriptive catalogue ... would be a very impor tant ingredient of the profit to be derived for such a purpose, or that the property or value would have been materially deteriorated by a premature ci rculation which had tended to sa tiate the public interest in the circumstance?'
46 For Lord Cotten ham LC, considerations of property -at least in the etch ings and perhaps in some broader sense of tradable patronage -made it possible to d istinguish Clark v. Freeman and to bring the case within the boundaries of established authority.
Had there been a need to resolve the issue of passing off in Prince Albert v. Strange, a more precise account of the property at stake might have been given. It might have been made clearer that this lies, as is now largely accepted, in tradable goodwill, defined as 'the attractive force that brings in custom'Y Fu rther, that for celebrities, their ability to provide patronage -to give authority, and through that authenticity, to claims made by traders about their goods or services (includi ng especially those that reveal something oft he celebrity's own 'bent and turn of the mind , ... feeli ngs and taste') -is a form of goodwill.
48 But, per haps anticipating wh at would come after the award of an injunction narrowly framed to 44 where a misrepresentation of endorsement or approval is still an element of passing off, at least in the legal discourse, 5 1 it was decided a broader basis had to be found in Prince Albert's case for grant of an injunction against the authorised exploitation of material of a private and personal kind -a basis found in common law copyright and breach of trust and con fidence. 50 See 'Craze for Royal Relics' above n. 36, noting, e.g., the existence of a market for sa les of bloomers with the Queen's m onogram, which aba ted o nly when it was realised that these were issued to everyone in the roya l household 'down to the scullery maid ' . propriety and morals, which, though causing most serious discomfort, pain and affli ction to individuals, the law refuses to treat as actionable, unless those offences have occasioned some recognisable damage of a particular kind'. 54 However, the Vice-Chancellor added, 'the principle of protecting property ... shelters the privacy and seclusion of thoughts and sentiments committed to writing and desired by the author to remain not generally known'. 55 In such cases, the Vice-Chancellor acknowledged, reaping public reward from mental labour may not really be the claimant's object, for 'a man may employ himself in private in a manner very harmLess, but which, disclosed to society, may destroy the comfort of his life', revealing as it does an aspect ofhimself'of a kind squaring in no sort with his outward habits and worldly posi tion' . 5 6 Nevertheless, the vindication of privacy by a property right was rationa lised under the rubric of p roperty-identifying a sphere of 'private use or private amusement' for the <various forms and modes of property which peace and cultivation might discover and introduce' . this utilitarian age premised on rewardin g and encou raging activities the products of which may be found enjoyable or useful by an audience (if only of private friends or even the author alone), when it comes to breach of trust and confidence the choice not to publish 'priva te' info rmation ' kept private' may be a matter of personal choice which others should be trusted to respect on this account alone.
Invasion of privacy
The reasons for giving accord to personal cho ice over private matters were not articulated in Prince Albert v. Strange and may not even have been fully understood in the very middle of the nineteenth centu ry.
62 John Stuart Mill's influential argument in On Liberty that individual tlourishing in an atmosphere of freedom is good not only fo r the individual but for society, was still to come. It was only in 1859 that Mill was to elaborate the idea that:
ITI here is a sphere of action in which society, as distinct from the individual, has, if any, only an indirect interest; comprehending all that portion of a person's life and conduct which affects only himself ... [by which II mean directly, and in the first instance; . . . land tlhe only freedom which dese rves the na me, is that of pursuing o ur own good in our own way, so long as we do not attempt to deprive others of theirs, or impede their efforts to obtaio it. 6 -' Nevertheless the germ of Mill's thinking was to be found in writings of David Hume and Adam Smith who held that a civi l society could only benefit from a high level of respect for individual freedom and control.
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The early English utilitarians who employed the greatest happiness of the greatest number as the measuring stick of value also argued that happiness for each person is a matter of individual choice. 65 And Mill himsel f referred to a 'Greek idea of self-development ... [that i]n proportion to " 2 Certain ly The Times (the major da ily newspaper of the day) in commenting on the case initially offered little further explanation of why Prince Albert and his cons ort should he protected from ' int rusive vulgarity; in later commentary on Lord Cottenham's judgment referring somewhal more firm ly to a 'public'~ sympathy' with the Royals' feeli ngs that they 'can no longer endure living in a glass house': see above nn. 39 and 45. 6 1 'On Libert) ' Mill in writing his Autobiography as a means of 'stopping the mouths of enemies hereafter', who whispered scand alous t hings about his relationship with Harriet Taylor, 68 might also be contemplated. So too could commercial exploitation of the exchange value of any property that might be identified, a nticipated in discussions in Prince Albert's case about the prospect of an authorised exhibition. Since privacy was an aspect of liberty whose value was defined in utili tarian terms, grounded according to Mill 'on the permanent interests of a man as a p rogressive being', 69 recognising the value of privacy did n ot prevent recognition of other freedoms as important as well. Further, Mill cou ld easily accept that the ability to exercise all these freedoms in a forward looking way and plan maintaining that there are higher pleasures that are of more enduring happiness than lower pleasures, which those who have experienced both could appreciate: 'Essay on Bentham' in Mill, Utilitarianism, above n. 63, pp. 78-125 at p. 10 I; ' Utilitarianism' in Mill, Utilitarianism, ibid. pp. 251-321 at pp. 259-62. Nevertheless in accord with his liberal views, Mill held that it is for the individual to make the ultimate judgment in matters that concern only themselves; and in this respect he was more like Bentham than he cared to admit. 66 'On Liberty' in Mill, Utilitarianism, above n. 63, p. 191. 'beyond the passing moment', capturing value over time, depended on a measure of trust that others would 'join in making safe for us the very groundwork of our existence'.
70 Indeed such ideas were-and continue to be-intricately connected with the development of the equitable action for breach of confidence as a doctrine essentially about freedom (and with that security) of choice.
How little has changed Table I Privacy is more greatly emphasised (and property less) in the recent celebrity privacy cases compared with Prince Albert v. Strange. As Table   10 .1 shows, there was but one reference to 'privacy' and ten to 'private' in the judgment of Lord Cotten ham LC, whereas a comparable appellate 70 Mill is justly famous for his utilitarian arguments for freedom of speech, conduct and property but his argument that 'security, to everyone's feelings the most vital of interests' is also of utilitarian import is equally powerful, and allows us to recognise that the ability to trust in the conduct even of strangers is the basis of a modern liberal welfare society: see 'Utilitarianism' in Mill, Utilitarianism, above n. 63, pp. 309-10. 71 Recorded simply are instances of 'privacy' and ' private' as reported or used in each of the judgments surveyed. To the extent judges simply report what others have said with· out lending their support, the tallying process may overstate the value accorded by the particular judges, but nevertheless shows something of the val ue others place on privacy. Undo ubtedly some of the increased referencing to privacy/private in English judgments is due to the United Kingdom's implementation of the European Convention on Human Rights with its Article 8 right of'private life' , but New Zealand has no right of privacy in its Bill of Rights and even Australia-which has no Bill of Rights-has seen inc reased use of privacy language in modern breach of confidence cases: see, e.g., the judgment of Gleeson C) in Australian Broadcasti11g Corporation v. Lenah Game Meats (2001) 208 CLR 199 (IS references to ' privacy', 32 to 'private').
judgment in a modern case can easi ly multiply such references many times.
72 Thus the conclusion might be drawn that privacy is now a more significant social value than before -or at least that privacy was an emerging value in the Victorian age, whereas its importance is now clearly established.
Whether the current emphasis on privacy supports a conclusion that a shift has occurred towards a dignitary conception, in which privacy is purely and simply a right to be 'let alone', a right of' inviolate personality', is another matter. In general little support can be found in the cases. Rather, the new talk of privacy appears to reflect a judicial consensus that, as Mill claimed, '[aJmong the works of man which human life is rightly employed in perfecting and beautifying, the 1 1rst in importance surely is man himself. 73 Indeed in Von Hannoverv. Germany it was simply stated that the European Convention's right of private life was 'primarily intended to ensure the development ofeach individua l in his relations with other human beings'
74 -suggesting that dignity is not an immutable end of human existence (a lthough it may be a component of tlourishing). 75 Equally, while it is now commonly ac<.:cpted that 'stars are made for profit' and 'different star images' are presented to the world, from which 'the audience selects . . . the meaning and feelings, the variations, inflections and contradictions, that work for them '/ 6 the utilitarian logic of treating celebrity stories as warranting protection has not escaped the courts. Thus in Douglas v. Hello! the celebrities were held entitled to control the way their wedding was portrayed to their public, their right to 'profit from information about themselves' acknowledged. 77 The information shared some characteristics of copyright works, its story-telling quality lying in the myth of the perfect wedding between the perfect couple told to an audience that is at some level aware of the myth. 78 But the more obvious analogy is to trade secrets is in line with references to 'profit to be derived' and 'value ... materially deteriorated by a premature circulation' in Prince Albert v. Strange? 9 Final ly, courts working in the tradition of Prince Albert v. Strange have found it relatively easy to accept that a celebrity may choose to revea l selectively certain personal information, including for profit, yet maintain the privacy of the rest, 80 giving little credence to the idea that privacy cannot be 'wrapped up and sold ': the penalty for doing so being privacy obliteration.
81 Celebrities may find themselves subject to certain trust obligations, as Campbell found to her cost in publicly lying about her drug addiction, 82 but courts have stopped short of treating self-publicity as engendering an automatic obligation of utter transparenC)'. 83 Even the language of 'reasonable expectation' of privacy, which features in some stated -although the court appeared later to doubt that significant damages could be obtai ned for breach after commerciali sat ion, confi rming Lindsay J's modest award for ' mental distress· to lJouglas and Zeta-Jones and rejecting their argument for a notional licence fee after exclusive rights had been sold to OK!: at para. 237ff. and further para. I 07 ( if anything suggesting there may be reason to reduce damages for mental distress based on the earlier nuthorisation (lf filming and publication by OK!). The reasoning o n remedies may be questioned and no doubt will be the subjec t of further comment. of the recent cases, has not been taken to allow those curious to know to override a privacy subject's choice to maintain privacy if the choice is one that might equally have been made in the privacy subject's place. 84 The conclusion is one that Mill, who hated the 'despotism of custom', would have approved. 85 On the other hand, more to the foreground now is the role played by the not entirely disinterested agents of public 'exposure' of private, personal celebrity information: the modern self-styled arbiters of custom . Now it is publicly acknowledged by those well-accustomed to its inner workings that 'Fleet Street has always had a two-way relationship with the celebrities. One day you are cock of the walk and the next day you are a feather duster.' 86 However, already by the time of Prince Albert v. Strange some of the basic features of the modern British media at work could be observed: the itinerant disaffected journalist (the forebear of the modern paparazzi), the profit-motivated publisher, a burgeoning public avid for news -as well as the technologies that permitted not only mass speed printing but also mass distribution of its products. 87 When newspapers were widely available, cheap to read, even cheaper if their contents could ibe shared in 'the new urban conditions', and popular in reliance on 'habitual tastes and markets' of an increasingly literate public, it is not surprising that they were gathering a substantial following. 88 everything including the minutiae of cases before the courts, and on virtuaUy every occasion where an opinion might be given it was expressed; nor was this inevitably favourable to those considered celebrities, especially if the celebrity in question was not an irrevocable part of the establishmentat risk particularly foreigners and anyone whose opinions or beliefs were different from the mainstream. 89 Then, as now, there was also the feverish excitement of the story unfolding from day to day, the future never able to be foretold by an audience hooked on the drip-feed of serialisation through the writings of Charles Dickens and other relaters of fictional yet lifelike stories, 90 with the opportunity for a judgmental response everpresent. A. N. Wilson observes that 'one of the strangest legacies left to the world by the Victorians is the popular press ... fuelled by sensationalism and moralism', its treatment of information turned into a business enterprise applying a broad Victorian ethos of 'money-making'. 91 The sheer entrepreneurship of the enterprise could be admired -and some of those involved took great personal risks in their efforts to break new ground in the collection and reporting of material. 92 For a whi le it might have perhaps been imagined that freedom of thought and discussion were necessarily promoted by freedom of tht:! press, as contended by Strange in Prince Albert v. Strange. 93 But even Victorian liberals ultimately had diffi culty justifying the press>s more muckraking activities in terms of free speech. If anything these could be viewed as efforts at controlling meaning not facilitating greater public understanding, the utilitarian justification for free speech put forward by Mill. 94 And in this, Mill concluded, they were largely successful -referring to:
... However, these concerns were not to be expressed for a decade to come; and it took until after the end of the following century for courts finally to address the problematic question of the public interest in knowing information that is neither political no r especially literary or artistic, but is simply, as Knight Bruce V -C said in Prince Albert v. Strange, a matter of 'general curiosity'. 96 By that time, of cou rse, the equitable obligation was already being framed as a filter fo r acts of'falsehood or duplicity las well as I unfair or ungenerous use of advantage' in obtaining and/or using private personal information, being acts which according to Mill 'require a totally different treatment' 97 -and modern courts continue to abide by the dictum in their assessments of whether a breach of confidence has occurred for which a remedy should be given. 98 If anything the language of trust has entered the vernacular of privacy itself-shown by the European Court's emphasis in ( if the 'sole purpose [of publication! was to satisfy the cu riosity of a particular readership regarding the details of the applicant's private life, I this I cannot be deemed to con tribute to any debate of genera l interest to society despite the applicant being known to the public' and "in these circumstances freedom of expression calls for a narrow interpretation"). 
